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Framing effects on fear of terrorism and willingness to sacrifice civil liberties 
 
Ellory Dabbs  
 
 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether differences in the way the media frames 
an act of violence leads to different reactions by consumers. In particular, it was hypothesized 
that the ideology and race of the perpetrator would lead to differences in perceptions of whether 
or not the attack was terrorism. A vignette-style experiment was performed using respondents 
recruited via MTurk. Four versions of the vignette were evenly distributed to 441 respondents, 
changing whether the frame contained a photo, the ideology, and the name of the perpetrator. 
Using measures of fear from this data it was then investigated whether or not fear made 
respondents more willing to trade their civil liberties for a feeling of increased security. Though 
few significant findings were discovered in this research, it is believed that the findings will 
contribute to the broader topic by suggesting new directions for terrorism and media framing 
research in the future
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Essentially from birth, humans are exposed to the media, a powerful tool that can be used 
to shape people’s perceptions of social issues. Exposure is nearly impossible to avoid in modern 
society; for this reason, it is important to understand how the media affects its audience. 
Many types of stories, even when proven false, stick with people. False images portrayed 
on the news lead to misconceptions about threats, leading its audience to place emphasis on 
‘problems’ that are not an actual threat (Slone 2000; Nellis and Savage 2012). The media 
consistently covers brutal violence and provokes emotional responses from its viewers; 
depending on how they are framed, these stories cause consumers to feel scared for themselves 
and for the wellbeing of their loved ones (Slone 2000; Nellis and Savage 2012).  
The overall effect of media coverage of violence has been studied by several scholars, 
especially when that violence can be considered terrorism. Terrorism is likely to gain media 
attention; according to Surette et. al (2009:360), “…terrorist acts are more likely to receive 
media coverage if they follow the canons of television entertainment and newsworthiness—
scarcity, unexpectedness, hostility to elite people or nations, violence, intensity, and 
unambiguity.” However, coverage of terrorist attacks also leads to “dehumanizing the enemy” 
(Steuter and Wills 2010:152). Dehumanizing the enemy leads to prejudices against different 
groups of people (Das et. al 2009). News reporters use dehumanizing language to disconnect 
their viewers from the “enemy” furthering the gap between “us” and “them” (Das et. al 2009; 
Steuter and Wills 2010; Powell 2018). When the enemy looks different than “us,” it is easier to 
call for harsh punishment. All of these points considered, the media is influential in constructing 
public opinions that will ultimately influence anti-terrorism policy.  
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The goal of this framing-effects study is to determine how different news frames 
concerning an attempted terrorist attack contribute to changing perceptions amongst readers. 
Additionally, this framing-effects study will seek to determine how a news frame influences 
different reactions from readers and their demands for anti-terrorism policy. Using a vignette-
style experiment, readers will be exposed to different frames of essentially the same story. Two 
of the vignettes will contain a picture, and two will not. Two versions will be framed around an 
attempted attack by a perpetrator acting for ISIS, and the other two will be framed around an 
attack by a perpetrator acting for a neo-Nazi group. Following, they will be prompted to answer 
questions related to the article to determine their views about fear of terrorism and civil liberties 
tradeoffs. The overarching goal comes in two parts: first, to understand whether a photo makes a 
difference in the vignette; second, to understand whether fear leads to willingness to support 
anti-terror policies that will exchange civil liberties freedoms for an increased feeling of security.  
Framing Techniques 
Important in influencing public fear is how a story is framed in the media. A frame is a 
tool used in the media to construct a story. According to Woods (2011:201), “…frames…exist 
first of all as words, images, and symbols that appear on paper and in other media.” Frames are 
not one key word, image, or phrase; they depend on the social context and the purpose of the 
story. Additionally, a frame can extend beyond just one story; frames can cover an entire issue, a 
prolonged event, a social leader, etc. (Entman 2004). If a frame does not have “magnitude,” an 
aspect that is shocking enough to draw readers in, it will not be successful in sticking around; 
thus, the most notable frames will be able to stay with its readers and have lasting impact 
(Entman 2004:31). 
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A news frame is how the journalist constructs their story.  According to Scheufele 
(1999:109), journalists consider several factors when constructing a frame, including “…social 
norms, values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic 
routines, and ideological or political orientations…” Therefore, a journalist does not sadistically 
construct a frame to be misleading, but rather, they construct a frame based on the context of the 
period. Journalists want their story to be a success, and they must use techniques that will draw 
readers in. According to Woods and Marciniak (2016:3), “some words, phrases, symbols, and 
images are thought to evoke emotions, engage cognition, and access memories in ways that 
others do not.” This makes the story more interesting and leaves a lasting impact.  
The influence of a frame is very powerful. A change of one word or phrase can influence 
the whole interpretation of a story; therefore, it is important to take great care when constructing 
a frame. The differences can be subtle, and the story can still influence its readers (Nellis and 
Savage 2012; Woods 2012). These differences could include how one describes a victim, attack, 
who is at risk, etc. People tend to worry more when an article is framed with the idea that they, 
or someone they love, is at great risk of attack (Nellis and Savage 2012). Thus, exposure to the 
same types of framing techniques can change people’s perceptions in ways that give them a less 
accurate view of the world, especially if their knowledge on the topic is limited or misinformed.  
Especially influential in a frame are the images it contains. As stated by Brinson and 
Stohl (2012:273), “…the media help provide us with the images we hold in our heads about the 
world around us.” According to Bendelow (1993), “…images tend to prompt fast, yet often 
detailed responses. Responses to visual imagery may be more immediate than responses to 
textual or other vignette forms…” (Hughes and Huby 2004:41). Because frames that contain 
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images have been found to provoke greater responses, the following hypothesis will be 
investigated:  
H1: A vignette containing a photo will increase fear compared to a vignette containing no 
photo.  
Framing after 9/11  
 The lasting effects of media framing can be illustrated by reviewing the literature on post-
9/11 media framing. These attacks were a shock to the nation and had a great deal of magnitude; 
therefore, the media actively covered them. (Entman 2004; Jorndrup 2016). Because of the 
unexpected magnitude of the event, the aftermath of 9/11 framing can still be observed today, 
and likely had a role in influencing modern attitudes toward terrorism and civil liberties 
tradeoffs.  
 The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, reminded the citizens of the United States that 
the country was not invincible and that terror attacks could lead to mass destruction. It was the 
overall attitude that those who committed the attacks were evil, and they needed to be dealt with 
(Entman 2004). The enemy was constructed as Middle Eastern terrorists, and they presented a 
clear and present danger. It was at this time that President George W. Bush started uttering words 
such as the “axis of evil” and the “war on terror,” which were found in many news articles 
(Azpiroz 2012:192; Entman 2004:107). Despite the fact that there was no real proof of a 
continued threat of international terrorism, the president continued to frame the event as such, 
with the help of the media, and within days Congress unanimously approved military action in 
the Middle East. This new war was seen as necessary, and even as “retaliatory” on the terrorists 
that ripped the nation apart (Steuter and Wills 2010). 
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Though there was criticism and talk that Bush was overreacting, those concerns were not 
generally accepted or broadcasted (Woods 2012). And Congress was not the only entity to 
approve of military action; the public overwhelmingly approved of war more than ever in history 
and values shifted toward support for military action and spending (Woods 2012). Additionally, 
most people were willing to give up some of their freedoms and civil liberties to feel more 
secure. For this reason, one could be led to believe that fear makes people more likely to respond 
positively to policies that take away freedoms if it makes them feel safe. Based on this, the 
following hypothesis will be investigated:  
H2: The more fearful people are, the more willing they will be to give up civil liberties 
rights for a feeling of increased security. 
Constructing the Enemy 
 These post-9/11 attitudes led to writing that “dehumanized the enemy” (Steuter and Wills 
2010:156). Journalists and politicians refer to Muslim people and terrorists alike as animals, 
vermin, and monsters, that need to be hunted, trapped, and killed (Steuter and Wills 2010; 
Powell 2018). This kind of language, according to Steuter and Wills (2012:164), “create[s] fear-
driven and inappropriate responses that…might lure the public into disregarding due process of 
the law.” These fearful responses to news coverage could have an impact on how people view 
the “enemy” and correspondingly increase public support for policies that reduce civil liberties, 
especially when it comes to those who are descended from the Middle East.  
Acts of violence are much more likely to quickly be labeled as terrorism if the perpetrator 
is descended from the Middle East without looking into the suspect’s motivations or nationality 
(Powell 2018). Even if the person was a U.S. citizen, the media is quick to link someone who 
looks Muslim to terrorism than someone who does not. Additionally, because of post-9/11 news 
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framing techniques, people are often unsure what the difference between those who are radical 
Islamists and those who just practice the Islamic religion. This leads to the impression that 
“…the actions of one Muslim are equated to all Muslims” (Powell 2018:2). This leads to 
reactions from the public that reinforce stereotypes.  
If the perpetrator of a mass act of violence does not fit the look of your ‘standard’ 
terrorist, the media is careful in their framing. It is only when they have looked into the person’s 
relationships, international ties, mental health background, etc., that this person is labeled a 
terrorist (Powell 2018). Journalists hesitate in labeling acts as domestic terrorism and often try to 
pin the attack on the personality of the perpetrator—typically describing the attacker as a “loner” 
(Powell 2018). Additionally, even if the act fell under what would be considered terrorism, the 
media rarely labeled it as such unless the perpetrator was found to have pledged allegiance to 
some international terrorist group (Powell 2018). Thus, based on the preceding information, the 
following hypothesis was developed:  
H3: The ISIS frame will increase fear compared to the neo-Nazi frame. 
Counterterrorism Policies After 9/11 
Summarizing the literature up to this point, post-9/11 news frames have led people to be 
fearful of terrorism and prejudiced against those descended from the Middle East. The media is 
far more likely to label an act of mass violence as terrorism if the perpetrator is of Middle 
Eastern descent, and often avoids labeling an act of mass violence as terrorism if they can avoid 
it for white perpetrators. For this reason, politicians have been able to enact new policies and 
procedures that might overestimate the problem of terrorism and lead to differential treatment of 
different racial and religious groups. These policies often focus on “international” rather than 
“domestic” cases of terrorism, causing the public to fear the wrong thing (Brinson and Stohl 
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2012:272). After the attacks of 9/11, leaders took steps to enact preventative measures against 
future attacks from “outsiders.”  
Several counter-terrorism methods were introduced after 9/11. One of the most shocking 
is the preemptive measures authorities are able to take to ‘prevent’ terrorism before it can 
happen. According to De Lint and Kassa (2015:354), “Government officials portray the threat of 
terrorist attacks as both immediate and of great magnitude.” This kind of portrayal of the threat 
brings about a feeling of “moral panic” where the public feels defensive of their values (De Lint 
and Kassa 2015:354). According to Welch (2015:4), “since 9/11, the public has demonstrated 
considerable support for harsh national policies aimed at preventing terrorism and punishing 
suspected terrorists.” Therefore, there is a demand from the public to continue spending on 
counter terrorism policies and to be diligent in terrorism prevention.  
But counter terrorism policies have serious implications for the citizens of the United 
States. Supporters of counter terrorism policies often have the attitude that the government 
should do what it must to prevent terrorism; however, they do not always realize the implications 
these policies have for both their own freedoms and the freedoms of American minorities 
(Viscusi and Zekhauser 2003). Studies have shown that people are far more likely to support 
counterterrorism policies if they view people from the Middle East as the would-be terrorists 
(Viscusi and Zekhauser 2003; Welch 2015). When people are faced with making decisions about 
terrorism policy, it has been found that unless they perceive themselves as being directly 
impacted, they are supportive of policies that would potentially take away some of their own 
civil liberties rights. Consider airport searches after 9/11. In a study done by Viscusi and 
Zekhauser (2003:104), evidence was found that respondents were more likely to support 
“targeted airport searches” if it reduced their own personal wait times. However, when faced 
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with the question of supporting a policy of general airport searches, the respondents were much 
less likely to be in favor. This fact is also illustrated when Viscusi and Zekhauser (2003:107) 
asked respondents if they would support policy that allowed the government to essentially 
“snoop” on emails, phone calls, etc., of anyone they suspected of terrorism. This is because the 
policy would not be targeting a particular group of people, rather, the general public as a whole.  
Those who are likely to stereotype a terrorist as being of Middle Eastern descent are more 
likely to support punitive policies (Welch 2015). If these people are fearful of terrorism in 
general, and are believing that terrorists are coming from a specific minority group, then it is 
likely they will support policies that will take away some of their civil liberties rights. This is 
because they probably believe that since they are not terrorists, they will not be impacted by anti-
terror policies, other than being kept safer. From this literature, the following hypothesis was 
developed: 
H4: The ISIS frame will increase willingness to trade security for civil liberties. 
Entrapment in Counterterrorism Efforts 
The policy focused on in this paper is entrapment. The F.B.I. has been involved in several 
stings to catch terrorists before they strike. These “pre-crime” practices are designed, as stated, to 
stop terrorist attacks before they happen (De Lint and Kassa 2015:361). However, critics argue 
that these “pre-crime” tactics are not useful in preventing would-be terror attacks, but rather, they 
“manufacture synthetic terrorists” (De Lint and Kassa 2015:361). De Lint and Kassa (2015) state 
that most of the big terrorism plots since 9/11 were actually built by the F.B.I.; the F.B.I. tracks 
down people who they think could possibly commit an act of terrorism and guide them along.  
It is important to understand how these F.B.I. stings work. As explained by Aaronson 
(2013:2): “…the F.B.I. uses one of its more than 15,000 registered informants—many of them 
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criminals, others trying to stay in the country following immigration violations—to identify 
potential terrorists. It then provides the means necessary for these would-be terrorists to move 
forward with a plot—in some cases even planting specific ideas for attacks.” The subject of these 
stings is offered money, weapons, and anything they would need to commit the act by the F.B.I. 
(Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 2018). However, they never actually get anything concrete. The 
informants, on the other hand, are compensated monetarily—often in large sums.  
There is a major flaw in these terrorism stings, however. Aaronson (2013) explains that 
when the F.B.I. performed drug bust stings, they could be certain that the subjects would have 
access to drugs without the help of the F.B.I. If they did not engage in criminal activity at the site 
that the F.B.I. created, they could easily find somewhere nearby to acquire the materials. 
However, this is not likely in terrorism stings. Aaronson (2013:4) states, “In terrorism 
stings…federal law enforcement officials assume that any would-be terrorists caught would have 
been able to acquire the means elsewhere to carry out their violent plans had they not been 
ensnared by the F.B.I. The problem with this assumption is that no data exists to support it—and 
in fact what data is available often suggests the opposite.” The subject of an F.B.I. sting is often 
mentally incapable of orchestrating an attack without help—and if an attack actually is 
successfully planned, usually the person fails before they meet their goal (Aaronson 2013; De 
Lint and Kassa 2015; Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 2018). Additionally, the subjects do not 
typically fit the description of your ‘average’ terrorist—smart, ideological, etc.,— suggesting 





Punishing the ‘Enemy’ 
So, who are these would be terrorists? They come in all shapes and sizes, but, 
unsurprisingly, they are not dealt with in a universal way. Two types of terrorism will be 
considered in this paper—“right wing” terrorism and “neojihadi” terrorism (Norris and Grol-
Prokopczyk 2018). Right wing terrorism acts motivated by far-right ideologies; white 
supremacist movements, anti-government movements, etc. (Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 2018). 
Neojihadi acts are the more commonly thought of acts—those committed (apparently) in the 
name of radical Islam. However, it is important to note that just because a person says an act is in 
the name of Islam does not mean that those who practice the religion agree with it.    
Brinson and Stohl (2012) stated that frames can activate different schemas depending on 
the content. This could include domestic versus international terrorism, or right wing versus 
neojihadi terrorism. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk (2018) were interested to know the differences 
in right wing entrapment versus neojihadist entrapment. In order to study this phenomenon, the 
authors use a mixed methods approach. They quantitatively review a database of post-9/11 
terrorism cases encompassing terrorism prosecutions including an informant from 2011-2014. 
According to Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk (2018), “The database includes 68 right-wing 
prosecutions, 190 neojihadi prosecutions, and 13 left-wing prosecutions, yielding a total of 271 
cases in our analyses.” They conducted statistical tests to create entrapment scores for each case, 
then chose the top five right-wing entrapment cases to review quantitatively.  They found that 
overall, claims of entrapment were less likely in right-wing terrorism cases. When entrapment 
was found, the conditions were less harsh than in neojihadist cases.  
These findings suggest that entrapment is less likely to occur in right-wing terrorism 
cases, and if it does, the methods used to prosecute will not be as severe. It is important to note 
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that right-wing terrorists are often white men of privilege. In other cases of terrorism, the 
perpetrator is often a disadvantaged minority (Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 2018). Because right-
wing terrorism cases are less likely to be orchestrated, and because people from the Middle East 
are often framed in dehumanizing ways, it could be assumed that just by looking at a perpetrator 
who fits the look of either type of terrorist could cause the public to react in different ways to the 
same actions by the F.B.I. Assuming that a picture does make a difference and does increase 
fear, respondents should be more likely to view the vignettes without photos more critical of the 
F.B.I.’s actions, and to be more supportive of the F.B.I.’s practices in the vignettes with photos. 
Thus, the final hypothesis will be tested: 
H5: A vignette containing a photo will increase willingness to trade security for civil  
liberties.  
It is important for the public to understand this counter terrorism practice and its 
effectiveness. Overall, De Lint and Kassa (2015) conclude that counter terrorism practices are 
only worthwhile if they are examined at face value. It might be true that the authorities are 
‘catching’ a lot of terrorists, but in reality, on 25 percent of cases believed to be terrorism are 
prosecuted as such (De Lint and Kassa 2015). This will lead to misconceptions about who is 
likely to be a terrorist, how effective counterterrorism really is, and what kind of methods we 
should be allowed to use to catch terrorists. 
Methodology  
The present study will utilize a vignette-style survey to best understand the public’s 
reactions to news stories about an attempted act of terrorism. A vignette is “text, images, or other 
forms of stimuli to which research participants are asked to respond” (Hughes and Huby 2004). 
This type of survey presents different versions of the same story to readers but changes the 
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stimuli. Following, respondents are asked questions not only to check their understanding of the 
article, but also to measure their views and opinions about different topics. If significant 
differences are found, then it is hypothesized that the different versions of the vignette affect the 
readers differently.  
This study used four different vignettes about an attempted bombing at a shopping mall 
on black Friday, one of the busiest shopping days of the year. In the article, the perpetrator was 
assisted by an F.B.I. informant to further his goal of gaining the attention of some extremist 
group. Before the suspect actually could go through with the act of mass violence, the F.B.I. 
arrested him. The article concludes with a statement that the defense attorney was seeking an 
entrapment case, stating that the man could not have gone through with the act without the help 
of the F.B.I. The stimuli that changed in the vignette were the perpetrator’s name, the group the 
perpetrator was trying to catch the attention of, and whether there was a picture with the article 
or not. Version one of the vignettes contained no picture, the perpetrator’s name was  
Hassan Najjar, and he was motivated to gain the attention of ISIS. The second vignette was the 
same, except it contained a picture of a man who looked to be of Middle Eastern descent—dark 
skin, dark hair, and dark eyes. Version three of the vignettes contained no picture, the 
perpetrator’s name was James Fields, and he was looking to gain the attention of the neo-Nazi 
Skinheads. Version four was identical to version three, except that it contained a picture of a 
white male with blue eyes and blonde hair.   
Data Collection 
Data was collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a quick and 
simple way to gain a relatively diverse sample. According to MTurk’s website, “The MTurk web 
service enables companies to programmatically access this marketplace and a diverse, on-
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demand workforce. Developers can leverage this service to build human intelligence directly into 
their applications” (mturk.com 2019). Data collected via MTurk has been found in the past to be 
about as reliable as data collected using other measures; however, reliable data does not mean 
that the participants will be representative of the population (McDuffie 2019). According to 
McDuffie (2019), “MTurk can be a great means of recruiting a diverse sample quickly and in a 
cost-efficient manner; however, the inherent differences observed between an MTurk sample and 
a sample collected using traditional methods might present significant challenges in generalizing 
the results of the study.” Thus, even though the data collected might not be as generalizable as 
collecting data from a more diverse sample, MTurk was the best way to collect data for this 
project. Any issues with the specific data collected for this project is addressed in the limitations 
section of this paper.  
The survey was uploaded to MTurk directly from Qualtrics, an online survey platform. 
Using Qualtrics, four different versions of the survey were created and distributed evenly to 441 
respondents.  A summary of demographic variables collected is included in Table 1.  
Dependent Variables  
 Two dependent variables were examined in this project. The first was fear. Fear was 
measured by asking respondents two questions—one about how likely the respondent thought a 
future attack was, and one about how worried the respondent was about the possibility of a future 
attack. Both questions asked the respondent to rate their response on a seven-point scale, with 
one being “extremely unlikely” and seven being “extremely likely.” The higher on the response 
scale, the more fearful that respondent was assumed to be.  
 The second dependent variable was willingness to trade civil liberties for a feeling of 
increased security. This was measured in two ways—first, by asking several questions about 
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what the respondent thought of the F.B.I.’s actions in the vignette, and second, by asking the 
respondent directly about whether they would be willing to support policies that would make 
them lose some of their civil liberties. It was hypothesized that willingness to trade civil liberties 
would depend on their views of the vignette.  
Independent Variables  
 The primary independent variable for analyses on fear was what treatment/vignette the 
respondent was assigned to. The first stimuli considered was the “package” of the race/ideology 
of the perpetrator (Middle Eastern/ISIS or White/neo-Nazi). The other primary independent 
variable for fear with whether or not the vignette contained a photo. These variables were 
hypothesized to cause differences in the dependent variables.  
 When considering the civil liberties hypotheses, the measures for fear became the 
primary independent variable, as it was hypothesized that the more fearful a respondent is, the 
more likely it is that they will be willing to sacrifice civil liberties for increased security.  
Control Variables 
 The remaining independent variables were included based on their influence on fear 
identified in prior research. These are summarized in Table 1, along with a summary of sample 
demographic characteristics.  
Table 1: Demographic Distribution of Respondents  
  N Percent Mean SD Min Max 
Gender 440      
Male 233 53     
Female  207 47     
       
Age 439  38.3 23 18 77 
18-24 28 6.40     
25-34 203 46.2     
35-44 104 23.7     
45-54 50 11.4     
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55-64 41 9.30     
65 or older 13 3.0     
       
Race 440      
Black, African, Caribbean  37 8.4     
Caucasian, White, European 348 79.1     
Central Asian/Arab 3 0.7     
East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, Taiwanese, etc.) 25 5.7     
South Asian (Indian, Pakistani,  
Bangladeshi, etc.) 4 0.9     
Hispanic/Latino/Latina 9 2.0     
Other 14 3.2     
       
Education  440      
Less than high school 3 0.7     
High school 85 19.3     
Associate's degree 68 15.4     
Bachelor's degree 211 48     
Master's degree 59 13.4     
Professional degree/Doctorate 14 3.2     
       
Citizenship 440      
I am a citizen of another country, not the U.S. 14 3.20     
I was not born in the US, but I am a US citizen 24 5.40     
I was born in the US, but one of my parents 
was born in another country 28 6.40     
I was born in the US, but both of my parents 
were born in another country 26 5.90     
I was born in the US and both of my parents  
were born in the US 248 79.10     
       
Political Ideology 439  4.60 1.80 1.0 7.0 
       
Political Party  440      
Republican 118 26.8     
Democrat  209 47.5     
Independent 103 23.4     
Not affiliated with a political party 5 1.10     
Something Else 5 1.10     
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Analytic Strategy 
 After viewing the vignette and answering initial questions gauging the respondents’ 
reaction, respondents were asked questions to measure how well they comprehended the 
vignettes they read. Overall, the majority of respondents seemed to understand the vignette.  
However, a lower percentage than desired answered correctly, with only 75 percent (N=332) of 
respondents identifying the correct weapon used in the vignette. 81 percent (N=180) of the 
respondents assigned to the ISIS treatment correctly identified the ideological motivation of the 
offender, and 85 percent (N=185) of the respondents assigned to the neo-Nazi treatment correctly 
identified the motivation of the offender in the vignette.  
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables measured. Though the 
descriptive statistics were telling of the results, further analyses were performed to confirm 
whether the findings were significant or not. Hypotheses 1 and 3 were concerned with 
differences in treatments. The study sought to determine whether frames made a difference in the 
responses to questions that measured fear. To determine whether differences were significant 
multiple t-tests were performed. New dummy variables were created to represent the groups 
being tested. Hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 5 concerned comparing a vignette containing a photo 
against a vignette containing no photo; therefore, a variable was created where 1 represented a 
treatment with a photo and 0 represented a treatment with no photo. Hypothesis 3 and  
hypothesis 4 were aimed to compare the ISIS frame against the neo-Nazi frame; therefore, a 
dummy variable was created where 1 represented the ISIS treatment and 0 represented the neo-
Nazi treatment. Both measures of fear, how worried the respondent was and how likely they 
thought a future attack was, were used in the t-tests for hypothesis 1 and 3. Both of the results of 
these tests are summarized in Table 3. To test hypothesis 4 and 5, which concerned civil liberties 
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rather than fear, differences were tested using dummy variables created to represent questions 
about the F.B.I.’s involvement in the story, rather than how fearful the respondents were. These 
results are summarized in Table 5.  
To determine whether fear influenced civil liberties tradeoffs, as described in  
hypothesis 2, several ordinary least squares regression analyses were performed at the bivariate 
level. Table 5 summarizes the results of these analyses and their significance.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Analysis 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Fear           
Worry 441 4.52 1.75 1 7 
Likeliness of future attack 441 4.62 1.56 1 7 
Civil Liberties           
F.B.I Was right to organize sting 441 4.0 1.0 1 5 
The F.B.I's actions are entrapment 441 2.72 1.2 1 5 
Freedom 441 3.84 1.81 1 7 
New law 441 4.19 1.68 1 7 
Wiretap Phones 441 2.73 1.19 1 5 
Intercept Emails 440 2.74 1.24 1 5 
Examine Internet Activities  441 3.0 1.3 1 5 
Detain Suspect Indefinitely 441 2.6 1.18 1 5 
Independent Variables           
Photo(worry) 215 4.58 1.76 1 7 
Photo(likely) 215 4.72 1.55 1 7 
 
Results/Discussion 
 The first hypothesis, that a vignette containing a photo will increase fear compared to a 
vignette containing no photo, was not supported for either of the variables that were designed to 
measure fear. For this hypothesis to be supported, we would have expected the mean for a 
vignette containing a photo to be significantly greater than the mean for a vignette containing no 
photo (Ha: diff<0). Although the means of the vignette containing a photo is greater for both 
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how worried the respondent is and how likely they think a future attack is, the t-test did not 
support its significance. It is reassuring that the means differ in the right direction, and perhaps 
with a greater sample they would have been found to be significant.  
 Hypothesis 3, that the ISIS frame would increase fear compared to the neo-Nazi frame, 
was also not supported for either of the variables measuring fear. In fact, the means did not even 
move in the right direction, suggesting that the neo-Nazi frame had a greater impact on the 
respondent’s fearful reaction. This is interesting, because no previous literature has suggested 
this finding. However, in the last few years, there have been several acts of mass violence that 
were committed by white supremacists. It is plausible that since acts of terrorism committed by 
ISIS are not as common in the media at this juncture that people are more worried about what 
they think is most likely to occur. But the means were barely different on the variable measuring 
worry about an attack, and they were not significantly different. Perhaps a greater, more diverse 
sample would have produced different results, but it is doubtful. There was more support for the 
assumption, not originally hypothesized in this paper, that people are more likely to be fearful of 
neo-Nazi acts when one only considers how likely respondents thought an attack was. There was 
significant support for differences in means going the opposite direction than hypothesized, 
meaning that the mean for the variable measuring fear was higher for the neo-Nazi frame. This is 
completely opposite of the hypothesis presented in this paper (H:a diff >0; p=0.05). This 






Table 3: T-tests for Significant Difference in Mean Values of Fear 




Photo Differences (worry) 441    0.24 
No Photo 226 4.46 0.12 1.75  
Photo  215 4.58 0.12 1.76  
Photo Differences (likely) 441    0.09 
No photo 226 4.52 0.1 1.56  
Photo 215 4.72 0.11 1.55   
Ideology Differences (worry) 441    0.53 
neo-Nazi 218 4.53 0.12 1.73  
ISIS 223 4.52 0.12 1.78  
Ideology Differences (likely) 441    0.94 
neo-Nazi 218 4.73 0.10 1.50  
ISIS 223 4.50 0.11 1.60   
 
Hypothesis 2, that the more fearful people are, the more likely they will be to give up 
civil liberties, was supported and significant for nearly all variables tested, with the exception of 
the bivariate analysis concerning the relationship between the likelihood of a future attack and 
willingness to give the government increased authority to wiretap phones and intercept email.  
The overwhelming pattern is that the more worried respondents were about terrorism, and the 
more likely they thought at attack was, the more they favored laws and practices that limited 
their civil liberties rights. However, the variable measuring how likely a future attack produced 
less significant results than the variable measuring worry. This could be because if a respondent 
is worried overall about terrorism, they might be more willing to take preventative measures 
regardless of if they think an attack is likely. Without an immediate threat, respondents might not 
see the usefulness of supporting policies, in particular wiretapping phones and intercepting 
emails, if they do not feel that an attack is likely to happen. Additionally, these practices in 
particular could have just seemed less useful than other ones. The most significant results were 
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present in the more vaguely worded questions, such as “To what extent would you support or 
oppose new laws to strengthen to strengthen security measures against terrorism, even if it meant 
reducing privacy protections?” and “To what extent would you be willing or unwilling to give up 
some of your personal freedom in order to reduce the threat of terrorism?” It is plausible that 
until faced with specific details of what freedoms they are giving up and what these new laws 
entail that the respondent is more willing to give up freedoms because they do not feel that 
supporting these laws will affect them. As we move toward defining these laws, fearful 
respondents are still likely to support them, but they do seem to be a bit more hesitant.  
Table 4: Correlations for Measures of Fear and Willingness to Give Up Civil Liberties  
 
Hypothesis 4, that the ISIS frame will increase willingness to trade security for civil 
liberties, was not supported, with nearly identical means found. Hypothesis 5, that a vignette 
containing a photo will increase respondents’ willingness to give up civil liberties, was not 
supported. The means also were nearly identical, indicating that a photo had no effect on 
respondent reactions regarding civil liberties rights.  
Overall, it seems that terrorism of any kind results in respondents being more supportive 
of increased F.B.I. action. The questions measuring support for the practices were “How much 
do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the F.B.I. was right to organize the sting 
 Worry (N=441)  Likelihood (N=441) 
 Unstandardized Coef. R  Unstandardized Coef. R 
Freedom 0.40** 0.41  0.17** 0.19 
New Law 0.35** 0.34  0.17** 0.18 
Wiretap 0.30** 0.2  0.06 0.04 
Intercept Email 0.30** 0.21  0.07 0.06 
Observe Internet activities 0.39** 0.29  0.11* 0.09 
Detain suspect indefinitely 0.37** 0.25  0.14* 0.11 
*p<.05 **p<.01       
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operation described in this article?” 43 percent of respondents (N=189) agreed with this 
statement, and 35 percent (N=153) strongly agreed. The other question measuring support for the 
F.B.I. practices focused on entrapment, asking the respondents, “How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following statement: the F.B.I’s sting operation described in the article should 
be classified as entrapment (helping the suspect commit a crime)?” 36 percent disagreed with the 
statement, 15percent strongly disagreed, and 19 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. Though 
these results are more evenly distributed, they still indicate that over half of the respondents 
would support practices that are intrusive of their civil liberties rights.  
These results are consistent with the findings from investigating hypothesis 3, and what 
seems to be the overwhelming results of this study—if respondents are fearful of terrorism, they 
will be more supportive of policies that restrict civil liberties freedoms. Framing does not seem 
to make much of a difference. 
Table 5: T-tests for Significant Difference in Mean Values of Supporting 
the F.B.I. Sting Described in the Vignette 
Group N Mean SE SD p-value 
Photo Differences (sting) 441    0.63 
No Photo 226 4.0 0.06 0.97  
Photo  215 3.98 0.07 1.0  
Photo Differences (entrap) 441    0.43 
No photo 226 2.70 0.08 1.23  
Photo 215 2.73 0.08 1.17   
Ideology Differences (sting) 441     
neo-Nazi 223 4.0 0.07 0.97 0.63 
ISIS 218 4.0 0.07 1.0  
Ideology Differences (entrap) 441    0.48 
neo-Nazi 218 2.71 0.08 1.19  





Conclusions and Directions for Future Research  
 Though most of the findings in this study were not statistically significant, the results 
make many implications for future research. First, a photo of the perpetrator’s mugshot had no 
significant effects in this study. Future research projects should consider using a different sort of 
photo—perhaps one of a crime scene—and measure if that results in different reactions. Though 
a photo had no effect on a respondent’s willingness to sacrifice civil liberties, there was some 
evidence supporting the idea that a photo could increase fear.  
 Another interesting suggestion that comes from this research is that people are more 
likely to fear the neo-Nazi terrorist than the Islamic one. Future research should delve into this 
idea more to understand whether these results were a one-time occurrence, having to do with the 
small and fairly liberal sample, or if this is a new trend. As previously suggested, the increased 
coverage of neo-Nazi terrorism could have an influence on how respondents are thinking about 
terrorism. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the media provided numerous stories and 
images of the attacks, and this was correlated with increased fear of people from the Middle East 
and Islamic Terrorism. It is possible that we are observing a similar pattern now, but with a 
different ‘enemy’ being painted by the media.  
 There were several limitations to this study. First, because the study utilized an online 
survey, there was no room for respondents to ask questions about responses they did not fully 
understand. This could explain the lower percent of manipulation checks answered correctly. 
Additionally, because the survey was not done face-to-face, there was less pressure for the 
respondents to take the survey seriously. Although there was a minimum amount of time 
respondents had to spend reading the vignette, this was not a guarantee that they actually felt that 
it was important to read the vignette carefully.  
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 Additionally, the sample was fairly small (N=441). Though these results are suggestive 
of possible trends in the public, the sample was not as representative as it could have been. 
Referring to Table 1, the respondents were mostly white, younger, democrat/liberal, citizens of 
the United States, and were rather highly educated. Education, age, and a liberal political 
ideology especially are known to be less fearful. If they are overrepresented in this sample, then 
that can skew results.  
 In conclusion, though the results of this study were not as expected, it is still useful in 
examining the relationship between the media and the public. Several implications for future 
research come from this study, and perhaps in the future more significant results will prove the 
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Appendix A: Vignettes  
 
WASHINGTON – ASSOCIATED PRESS 
 
The F.B.I. has significantly increased its use of stings in investigations, employing agents and 
informants to pose as an aid in attempted acts of terrorism.  
 
While F.B.I. officials say they are careful to avoid illegally entrapping suspects, their undercover 
operatives are far from bystanders. In recent investigations F.B.I. agents and informants helped 
people suspected of being involved in terroristic activity achieve their less than legal goals. 
 
Take, for instance, the case of <James Fields / Hassan Najjar> and the attempted bombing of a 
shopping mall in Seattle, Washington. <Fields /Najjar > told an FBI informant through online 
communication that he was interested in carrying out a large-scale attack on Black Friday, one of 
the busiest shopping days in the United States. When the F.B.I. informant questioned why, 
<Fields / Najjar > asserted that he wanted to do so to capture the attention of <ISIS / Neo-Nazi 
Skinheads>. Seemingly sympathetic to the cause, the informant said he could introduce 
<Fields/Najjar > to someone who could assist him but he needed proof that his intentions were 
genuine. 
 
<Fields /Najjar > wrote a letter swearing allegiance to do whatever it takes to impress <ISIS / 
Neo-Nazi Skinheads>, even if it meant producing mass casualties. The informant agreed that his 
intentions seemed legitimate and set up a time to meet with the third party to exchange plans and 
weapons.  
 
<Fields /Najjar> was arrested outside of the designated meeting spot on a charge of attempting 
an act of terrorism. 
 
Defense attorneys are seeking an entrapment case, stating that <Fields/ Najjar> would not have 
had the financial or intellectual means to carry out a terrorist attack were it not for the help from 
























[POST TEST FEAR AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: FOUR QUESTIONS] 
We would like to know your views about the article you just read.  
How would you rate the likelihood of an attempted act of mass violence such as the one 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 




How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the F.B.I. was right to 
organize the sting operation described in this article? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree  
Disagree 
Strongly disagree  
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the F.B.I’s sting operation 
described in the article should be classified as entrapment (helping the suspect commit a crime)? 
Strongly agree  
Agree 




[MANIPULATION CHECK: TWO QUESTIONS] 
What type of weapon was the potential attacker planning to use? 
Nuclear weapon 
Biological weapons 





     Extremely 
worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30 
None of the above 
 
What were the motivations for the defendant to attempt an act of mass violence? 
[RANDOMIZE] 
To be on the news 
To catch the attention of white supremacist group 
To catch the attention of Islamic terrorist group 
To catch the attention of animal activist groups 
To protest the commercialized holiday Black Friday 
 
The next set of questions will ask about your views of terrorism in general. Remember that 
your responses will be kept completely confidential, so please answer honestly.  
 
 
*For each statement, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly 




The following questions will ask you about your views about your civil liberties, or personal 
freedoms. Remember your answers will be kept confidential, so please answer honestly.  
*How concerned are you about the invasion of your personal privacy in the United States today? 
Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, only a little concerned, or not at all concerned?  
Very concerned 
Somewhat concerned  
Only a little concerned  
Not concerned at all 
 
*In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average 
person to give up some rights and liberties, or do you think we can curb terrorism without the 
average person giving up rights and liberties?  
 
It will be necessary for the average person to give up some rights and liberties.  
We can curb terrorism without the average person giving up rights and liberties.  
Don’t know.  
 
 
*In order to reduce the threat of terrorism in the United States, would you support or oppose 









Wiretap telephones      















To what extent would you support or oppose new laws to strengthen to strengthen security 
measures against terrorism, even if it meant reducing privacy protections? 
 
To what extent would you be willing or unwilling to give up some of your personal freedom in 
order to reduce the threat of terrorism? 
 
 
You are almost finished. We just have a few background questions. These are for statistical 
analysis purposes only. 
 
What is your age?  
*Add drop down menu in Qualtrics*  
 
With what gender do you identify? 
Male 
Female 
Other, please specify 
 
What is your race/ethnicity? 
 
Black, African, Caribbean 
Caucasian, White, European 
Central Asian / Arab 
East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc.) 
South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, etc.) 
Strongly 
oppose 
     Strongly 
support 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
unwilling 
     Very willing 





What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Less than high school 




Professional degree/Doctorate  
 
Have you ever been the victim of a violent incident? 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to answer 
How old are you?_____ 
How would you describe your political ideology? 
 
 
In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or 














     Very liberal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
